Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region by Rosen, Stephen Peter
Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 1 Winter Article 2
2001
Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region
Stephen Peter Rosen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rosen, Stephen Peter (2001) "Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/2
Dr. Rosen is the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of Na-
tional Security and Military Affairs at Harvard Univer-
sity and the director of the Olin Institute for Security
Studies, also at Harvard. He was the civilian assistant to
the director for Net Assessment in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the director of Political-Military
Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council,
and a professor in the Strategy Department of the Naval
War College. This article is adapted from a paper pre-
sented to the Asia-Pacific Forum held at the Naval War
College in June 2000.
© 2000 by Stephen Peter Rosen
Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 1
1
Rosen: Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
STRATEGIC TRADITIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Stephen Peter Rosen
What are strategic traditions? Why should we be concerned with them whenwe think about American strategic behavior in the Asia-Pacific region?
Why should we not concentrate on the material factors, the “hard” data that will
determine what nations will do?
Traditions are usually thought of as past patterns of behavior that affect, in
some way, current and future behavior. Traditions may be familiar and comfortable,
and for a social and political conservative, they are to be observed because they
embody the collective experience and wisdom of a society. But in the field of
military studies, tradition has both positive and negative implications. Tradition
may reflect the habits of the last war, vividly imprinted on the minds of the men
who waged it—valuable lessons learned, lessons paid for with blood. Tradition
may also be habits of the last war that make it difficult to see and react to change.
A strategic tradition can also be thought of as a variation of “strategic cul-
ture,” the cognitive lens through which we view the world, the lens that fo-
cuses our attention on the policy options that are worth taking seriously,
and away from the frivolous options, the “nonstarters.” Strategic culture also
tells us what we should expect in terms of the reactions of other players, and
what the most important forms of interaction are. Because it is often difficult
to get good information on these issues in a timely way, strategic culture helps
us make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Academics may recom-
mend that under conditions of uncertainty one ought to wait until the nec-
essary information has been collected, but policy makers often do not have
that luxury, and at such times strategic culture or tradition is an invaluable
decision aid.
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Why do people have the strategic cultures or traditions that they do? Their
cultures emerge from the intense emotional experiences through which they
have passed, experiences that created vivid and enduring memories that readily
spring to mind. Munich, Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis, and the war in
Vietnam were such experiences. When future, or even present, conditions are
difficult to discern, people make decisions based on what they see, and what they
see is influenced by their memories of what has happened in the past. Sometimes
these are personal memories; sometimes they are organizational or national
memories. For example, when confronted with Ho Chi Minh, about whose ulti-
mate intentions there
was some doubt ,
Americans tended to
observe that he was an
ideological dictator.
He was, but memory then added statements about what ideological dictators
were likely to do and what this nation needed to do in anticipation: “We know
what ideological dictators are like, because we faced them in the past, and we
know that we need to stop them with military power.” That was not objective re-
ality, but it was the way Americans decided what reality meant in terms of what
they had to do. These sets of interpreted memories can be thought of as part of
our culture, our tradition.
When a nation is confronted with complex, ambiguous situations that are
difficult to understand, its cultural perspective may affect how it reacts. Peter
Schwartz is an expert in helping business executives realize, by means of discus-
sions and interviews, what their assumptions are about how the world works
and what factors drive developments in the marketplace. It is important for ex-
ecutives to understand how they look at the world, because they may not fully
realize what is driving their decisions and what factors they may be paying too
little attention to.
Iain Johnston analyzes the same kind of issues with regard to the Chinese na-
tional security elite, not by means of direct discussions and interviews but by
reading the texts that members of the elite study and discuss. This is a useful
technique—though not without problems, since what people read and study
does not always reflect the ideas inside their heads. It is a particularly problem-
atic technique when the books that people read say contradictory things or in-
clude passages that can be interpreted in contradictory ways. The technique
works better for people who are told explicitly how they should read the relevant
texts and are punished if they deviate from the correct interpretation. The cadres
of the communist parties of the world constitute such groups, as do, to a lesser
extent, the officer corps of military organizations that have officially approved
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
A strategic tradition can also be thought of as a variation
of “strategic culture,” the cognitive lens through which we
view the world.
3
Rosen: Strategic Traditions for the Asia-Pacific Region
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
doctrines and training materials. Members of hierarchical, disciplined organi-
zations are especially likely to have meaningful, shared strategic traditions.
That said, what can we say about the American perspective on Asia and the
Pacific? There are all kinds of Americans; they have had different experiences
and have read different books. It is next to impossible to point to a particular
American tradition that says anything useful or specific about the shared mental
perspectives of nearly three hundred million rather individualistic people. Let
us, instead, talk about four smaller groups of people, about whom we may be
able to say something a bit more specific, because they share experiences and
belong to disciplined organizations. Then we will suggest how and why objec-
tive reality may cause problems for people who have these mental images of
Asia and the Pacific.
What are the strategic traditions and perspectives of the U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps, Army, and Air Force with regard to this region? What have these services
experienced there over the last fifty years? How might those experiences have
created memories that affect their outlooks? It may be objected that services do
not have genuinely national strategic perspectives, that they concern themselves
with military operations, not the general relationship of political goals to mili-
tary means. Yet services do have strategic perspectives that relate military means
to military goals, and their views on what a future war would be like and how it
would be fought often have a powerful impact on higher-level policy. For these
reasons, service perspectives matter.
When speaking of the Pacific, it is natural to begin with the U.S. Navy. Let us
simplify matters: what would senior naval officers say if asked how they thought
about the Pacific? The response of a representative officer might be as follows:
The Pacific belongs to us. The most important experiences my organization has
lived through over the last fifty years demonstrated over and over again that we can
dominate the Pacific and so enable the United States to project power and influence
to the periphery of the Asian landmass. After the defeat of Japan and withdrawal of
the British, we were the only major naval power left in the region. As the Japanese
navy revived, it did so under our tutelage, in cooperation with us, and in ways that
did not challenge us. The United States was able to fight a major war in Korea uti-
lizing our unchallenged command of the sea for aircraft carrier operations, am-
phibious landings, and logistical support of ground and air forces in Korea and
Japan. We were able to use carrier aviation in the Vietnam War unopposed by na-
val forces or significant land-based antiship weapons systems. We had a problem
with air-to-air combat in Vietnam, but specialized training, the Top Gun pro-
gram, fixed that.
R O S E N 1 7
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The Soviets were a problem, but we dominated the strategic antisubmarine-
warfare world, and they never really learned how to do blue-water naval opera-
tions: the Soviets had severe problems up to the end of the Cold War with at-sea
replenishment, for example. They never mastered even the rudiments of carrier avi-
ation. The Backfire bombers could have been a problem, particularly if they had
used nuclear antiship weapons, but we never really believed, in our heart of
hearts, that the Soviets would go nuclear at sea early in a war. If we had believed
that, we would have had to acknowledge that we had a big problem for which we
had no solution.
The Chinese navy is not in the same league with the Soviets, let alone us. The one
or two advanced destroyers and antiship missile systems they have do not funda-
mentally change that picture. When we sent two carrier battle groups to the waters
near Taiwan in 1996, we showed everybody that we still rule the Pacific and can in-
fluence events on the Asian periphery.
Today and for the future, we can operate in the Pacific by means of a network of
bases and ports on foreign soil. This way of conducting operations began with the is-
land-hopping campaign across the Central Pacific in 1943–45 against Japan. It
continued through the Cold
War with bases in Japan itself,
Okinawa, the Philippines, and
elsewhere. We have had some
problems with the Philippines
and in Okinawa, but we can manage them. In any case, other people, like the
Singaporeans or the Indians, would open their doors to us if and when a serious
Chinese naval force emerged.
What about the Marine Corps? A senior officer from that service might give
this kind of response:
We have fought many times in the Pacific-Asia theater, and it has been a deadly
place for us. From the Boxer Rebellion to Tarawa and Iwo Jima, from the Chosin
reservoir to Khe Sanh and Hue, a lot of Marines have died there. As amphibious
forces, as straight-leg infantry, as urban warriors, we have taken very heavy casual-
ties in Asia. We do not take this part of the world lightly, and we do not assume that
we would be able to execute our missions there easily, even with all the high-tech
weapons in the world—and which we, as Marines, get only the leftovers. We think
very hard about what to do there, militarily, and we are not sure what the answer is.
Why else would you think that we are engaged in the most serious set of military ex-
periments of any of the services to explore the future?
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An Army officer might reply to our question in this way:
We cannot trust American politicians when they talk about war in Asia. They
keep saying that the Army will not fight ground wars in Asia. But if you look back,
after World War II we never fought in Europe; all we did was fight ground wars in
Asia. First we excluded Korea from our defense perimeter in 1950, then Lyndon
Johnson said he would not send American boys to Vietnam to fight battles that
Asian boys should fight, and look what happened. Ground wars in Asia are like
other dirty, nasty things: they happen.
Asia is a big headache for the Army. When we fight in Asia, we compromise and
degrade our core skills in the conduct of high-intensity, combined-arms maneuver
warfare. Sure, we used a lot of helicopters in Vietnam, but that was still nothing like
going up against the Soviets. What we would like is a big, friendly Asian land power
on our side so we do not have to send hundreds of thousands of our soldiers into bat-
tle. General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell had it right, in the Second World War: train the
Nationalist Chinese and let them fight the Japanese. We did it right in Korea by
building up the South Korean army so we could go home. If Creighton Abrams had
been in charge earlier in Vietnam, Vietnamization would have started earlier, and
we would all have been better off.
And the Air Force:
We have air supremacy in Asia, and air supremacy is good. Strategic bombard-
ment works, it can win wars, and it has. Look at Japan in 1945: eighty Japanese cit-
ies on the target list, eighty Japanese cities destroyed, and the war was over with no
need to invade Japan. Nukes were nice but not essential. In Korea, airpower was the
war winner. After the Army and Marine Corps had fixed the Chinese, we could
plaster them and their supply lines, human waves or not.
The problem in Vietnam was that bastard Robert McNamara. When he became
secretary of defense, he crippled us with an incremental, politically micromanaged
air campaign. When Richard Nixon authorized LINEBACKER II, we showed what
we could do with a real air campaign. We got the North Vietnamese back to the ne-
gotiating table with the Christmas bombing of 1972. It was the Strategic Air Com-
mand that deserved the Nobel Peace Prize, not Henry Kissinger.
Like the Navy, we can operate in this region by means of a network of bases on
foreign soil. Air-to-air refueling means we can use fighters with ranges that work
very nicely in the European theater as bombers in Asia. That is a good thing, be-
cause it means that fighters can remain the dominant platforms in our service.
Putting words into the mouths of service officers is presumptuous. Drawing
out implications from the remarks we put into their mouths is even more
R O S E N 1 9
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presumptuous. Nevertheless, there seem to be common elements implicit in
what the services had to say.
• Nuclear weapons have not mattered very much in practice in the Asia-Pacific
region. We can still bomb and fight in Asia the way we would in the
“pre-nuke” environment, except for strategic sanctuaries in China and the
Soviet Union or Russia, since our wartime enemies have been small,
nonnuclear powers.
• Offensive forces, not defensive systems, have been dominant in this region.
• We have had, and will have, allies who give us bases and help when we
need them.
• Finally, getting to Asia from the United States is not a problem for warfighters,
however large a problem it is for the logisticians. We do not have to worry
about military opposition as we move our supplies across the Pacific.
The exercise becomes interesting at this point. Will future conditions in the
region be consistent with what our traditions tell us we can expect? There is
good reason to think not.
First and foremost, the as-
sumption of the irrele-
vance of nuclear weapons
for warfighting will clearly
be called into question. All of the potentially hostile nations with whom we may
have military problems are nuclear powers or nearly so: China, North Korea,
Pakistan, India, Russia, a unified Korea in the future, maybe Taiwan. How would
we use American military power against targets in the homelands of nuclear
powers? Would we attack the naval vessels of nuclear powers in wars about issues
less weighty than saving the world from military domination? Nuclear weapons
will matter a great deal; they create large areas that are off limits to American of-
fensive military power.
American ports and air bases on foreign soil will be increasingly vulnerable to
precision, nonnuclear attack. How will host nations that do not have nuclear
weapons with which to deter attacks against them feel about this? How will we
operate in the region if theater ballistic missile defense turns out not to be the
answer to our prayers? Defensive systems to protect and reassure our allies may
become the dominating factor, for American political purposes.
The availability of American allies is by no means assured. If there is a mili-
tary crisis involving China, Taiwan, and the United States, and if Japan does not
help, many Americans will ask why we are doing so much to help Japan. Trends
are already visible in Japanese politics that advocate security policies that are less
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closely tied to the United States. There could be significant anti-American senti-
ments in a unified Korea, since there would be no North Korean threat to justify
our presence. It will be many decades before India offers us bases, if it ever does.
It is hard to see how we will use significant amounts of conventional ground
forces in Asia. This has been said before. In the past, however, we went to war to
deal with what American political leaders perceived to be military aggression
across international boundaries. We would fight to help Taiwan for that reason,
but that would not involve ground forces. We really do not want to go to war
with China on the mainland of Asia. North Korea will not last forever. For what
will we use ground forces in this theater?
Over time, China will probably be able to make it harder for the United States
to intervene militarily in political crises near China. The question will not be
whether Chinese military forces are better or worse than ours but whether they
could increase the risks of American operations near them in diplomatic cri-
ses. Even getting to Asia will not be as simple as it used to be, because the Chi-
nese will have information warfare techniques that can slow us down; they
could “hack” into civilian air traffic control networks, for example, as James
Mulvenon of the RAND Corporation has pointed out. Other forms of attack
on our trans-Pacific logistics train are not too difficult to imagine, including
the use of biological agents.
What, then, is the point? We have drawn an overly simple picture for the pur-
pose of suggesting that the experiences of the American military over the last
fifty years have, in different ways, given the services collectively a perspective on
this theater that may make it difficult for them to perceive the emergence of a
probable future. If so, there may be subtle lags in this nation’s adjustment to the
future. Of course, things could work out differently. China could become com-
pletely democratic and peaceful, or it could fall apart. Asia could become like
Europe—rich, democratic, and peaceful. It may be that we suffer from the habits
of thought acquired during the Cold War: we have been thinking here about this
region as a theater of war, but perhaps it will not be a theater of war at all, actual
or potential, for decades. If that is the case, however, the United States will have
an even larger process of adjustment to manage. But if interstate war remains
possible in this region, the American military’s strategic traditions may not be
good guides to action.
R O S E N 2 1
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/2
